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Abstract
In this essay, we reflect on the outcomes of our interdisciplinary, team-taught, 
undergraduate core course in modern literature and evolutionary biology--a 
course designed to study the problems of identifying the emergence of distinctly 
“human” beings. The essay reflects on the positive, unexpected outcomes that 
we experienced, especially in student writing, via the metaphor of “emergent 
properties,” a biological term that refers to how new and complex traits, behav-
iors, or life forms emerge from the interaction of “simpler units” which in them-
selves would not produce these properties. Given that so much of the course 
content came from the students themselves—in particular, from their interest in 
the question of human consciousness as an evolved trait—we have incorpo-
rated excerpts from student essays that were produced for the course. These 
excerpts are preceded by student reflections and accompanied by observations 
about the compelling fashion in which students synthesized not only scientific 
and literary content, but also objective and subjective writing styles. 
Keywords 
interdisciplinary teaching, team-teaching, classroom practices, Arts and 
Sciences, student writing
Introduction
This essay concerns the unique learning experiences which emerged from a 
team-taught, interdisciplinary course called “Minds and Bodies” at Fairfield 
University, a Jesuit liberal-arts institution of 4,000 students in Fairfield, 
Connecticut. Part of a core course sequence for first and second-year students 
in the Honors Program, “Minds and Bodies” is taught annually, but with dif-
ferent faculty teams.  As professors of biology and English literature, ours 
was a particularly unusual pairing and as such, we were both enthusiastic 
and apprehensive about how we could combine these two fields into a single 
cohesive course.  Deciding upon objectives and learning outcomes was espe-
cially challenging, as we realized just how deep the differences were between 
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self and the inflexible laws of nature that had troubled 
writers like Mary Shelley, Alfred Tennyson, and Fyodor 
Dostoevsky? Could it explain how free will would actu-
ally evolve according to a natural law (traditionally its 
philosophical nemesis)? Our main purpose, here, is not 
to provide a detailed answer to that question (although 
our student contributors, below, engage it from dif-
ferent perspectives). Rather, it is to propose what this 
spontaneous development indicated in and of itself, 
namely, that the phenomena of emergent properties 
was actually happening in the class. That is to say, as 
the philosophical components of literary study and the 
empirical components of Biology interacted, a new 
matrix of innovative and often unexpected topics and 
ideas was evolving, especially in student writing and 
discussions. As in nature, our content had emerged 
spontaneously out of a collocation of life forms. 
 This unplanned content included students work-
ing through their personal discomfort regarding the 
ambiguity of what it means to be human (especially 
when “hard science” was helping to fuel the problem 
rather than solve it), developing novel social and politi-
cal perspectives and new views on spirituality and the 
autonomous self (including the challenge of integrating 
science into a religious viewpoint), and having vocif-
erous arguments about how to resolve the apparent 
contradiction between distinct consciousness and natu-
ral law. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the 
course, we had agreed to encourage a range of possible 
writing styles, with the one stipulation that students 
develop their ideas through the balanced integration 
of citations from both scientific and literary sources. 
When we read the results, we noticed that the unique 
evolution of our course’s subject matter or topical focus 
was reflected not only in the content of student’s essays, 
but also in their form. Just as their subjects were origi-
nal, so too did their writing cross discursive borders 
between source-driven research writing, the personal 
or reflective essay, and thesis-driven interpretive and 
Literature’s metaphoric and philosophical mode of 
understanding nature and Biology’s empirical mode. 
Resisting the urge to teach these as separate ways of 
looking at nature—to present them simply as two “dif-
ferent disciplinary lenses”—was a daily challenge. 
 The course that we ultimately developed centered 
upon the question of whether there is a mind or soul 
distinct from the biochemical brain and body. We 
approached the question from both evolutionary and 
philosophical angles, introducing students to the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing distinctly human traits and 
cognitive faculties from those in the animal kingdom 
while also engaging them in the humanist dilemma of 
the inability to affirm metaphysical absolutes or origins. 
Alternating between case studies in animal evolution 
and philosophical responses to evolution and genetics 
in 19th and 20th-century literature, our goal was to 
initiate student reflection on the possibility that human 
capacities such as love, language, or justice are not 
unique to our species, but properties that emerge along 
an evolutionary continuum.
 In Biology, an “emergent property” is a new and 
often unpredictable trait that arises through inter-
actions of the individual components of a system. 
Independent of the system, the individual component 
would not exhibit that particular property, behavior or 
function. As the semester progressed, we and our stu-
dents became increasingly interested in how the emer-
gence of complex biological properties such as male 
sexual displays and bird flocking might also explain 
how humans developed certain traits such as emotion, 
social behavior, cognitive function, and perhaps even 
what we refer to as the “mind.”   Although we had not 
planned it to be a focus of the course, we found our-
selves increasingly occupied by this topic: could human 
consciousness, and associated traits such as love and 
free will, be the emergent products of mere biochemical 
and cellular interactions, and if so, then might this not 
help to resolve the opposition between the autonomous 
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believed should be thought about in purely religious terms. 
Ironically, the answer I found did not undermine my belief 
in God or the dignity of the individual, but did result in an 
even more awe-inspiring view of the world.
 Literary works repeatedly reflect upon the impli-
cations of the considerable evidence which refutes the 
existence of uniquely human traits.  Even the capacity 
for language, emotions, and complex intelligence, three 
traits generally assumed to be exclusive to humans, 
appear to be subject to natural law.  This likelihood 
raises several philosophic questions that authors Ian 
McEwan and Fyodor Dostoevsky grappled with in their 
respective novels Saturday and Notes from Underground. 
Their important concern is this: if the complexity of 
human language, the depth of human emotions, and 
the degree to which humans can learn and reason are 
all determined by genes, then what choices are left to 
free will?  
 According to Tom Siegfried (2008), “Free will is 
not the defining feature of humanness, modern neuro-
science implies, but is rather an illusion that endures 
only because biochemical complexity conceals the 
mechanism of decision making” (para. 3). In his novel 
Saturday, Ian McEwan (2005) explores this challenge 
to the notion of autonomous consciousness. The main 
character, neurosurgeon Henry Perowne, believes that 
every human action is attributable to genetics: 
 One kilogram or so of cells actually encodes 
information, holds experiences, memories, dream and 
intentions. He doesn’t doubt that in years to come, the 
coding mechanism will be known, though it might not 
be in his lifetime. Just like the digital codes of repli-
cating life held within DNA, the brain’s fundamental 
secret will be laid open one day. (p. 262-263)  
 At the end of Saturday, Perowne uses this under-
standing of genetic inevitability to assess Baxter, a 
London street criminal, as suffering from Huntington’s 
disease.  By acknowledging that this disease predisposes 
analytical argument. Indeed, we often noted that it was 
when students were using close readings of literature to 
illuminate or interrogate concepts in genetics and evo-
lution, and vice versa, that their compelling synthesis or 
juxtaposition of scientific and literary modes of inquiry 
was most evident. 
 Below are excerpts from four student essays, each 
of which illustrates these general observations about 
the course and its outcomes. These essays were among 
the best in the course, but the main reason we select 
them is that they best demonstrate the original combi-
nations of scientific and literary concepts or approaches 
that the students themselves had generated. A few of 
the essays we received could be considered more tech-
nically proficient or rhetorically consistent than these, 
but less innovative, while many others were neither as 
original nor as technically sound. What really struck us 
as different about all the papers was that so many of 
them could only have been produced by independent 
thinking about the different ways that course concepts 
fit together. Even the least provocative among them 
tended to have a compelling, untypical insight. The ones 
below had many. Each excerpt is preceded by a student 
reflection on his or her processes of thinking, writing, 
and discovery and framed by our own comments and 
perspectives. 
Heather Boyd
The process of writing this paper was overwhelming at 
times as I reflected on the nature of humanity and attempted 
to ground rather large ideas in biology and literature. These 
thoughts infringed upon my indoctrinated view of man-
kind. Often, I struggled to articulate what I was slowly 
coming to understand. Through conversations with my 
professors and then by my writing, I was able to wrestle 
with the implications of my findings.  If I accept that every 
action I take is rooted in biology, how can I also believe that 
a supreme being created me as an unique individual with 
free will? By experiencing this process of confusion and, at 
times, frustration, I was able to unlock ideas which I had 
CURRENTS IN TEACHING AND LEARNING VoL. 2 no. 2, sPrInG 2010  
worcester.edu/currents currents@worcester.edu82      Pearson & McKay  –  Emergent Properties
has also led to the birth of individuality. Every brain 
is unique. Although human brains consist of the same 
fundamental components, from slight variations, differ-
ent personalities and tendencies emerge.  If your brain 
is unique, and your brain is part of the unique person 
that you are, then why do some people have a problem 
accepting the truth about free will?
 Although these realizations were hard to come to, 
I am starting to see the grandeur in my new understand-
ing of free will. I once had believed that knowledge of 
biological processes, genetics, and natural selection was 
irrelevant to my philosophic view of humanity. I was 
entirely wrong. The process of reconciling spirituality 
and science is an integral part in one’s exploration of 
their life philosophies. Furthermore, spirituality cannot 
be used in place of natural law or to explain what science 
has yet revealed. I believe that spirituality exists outside 
of natural law. Some people think that believing that 
human choices are shaped by natural law means that 
human beings are not in control of their destiny, but 
rather, everything is predetermined. Even Dostoevsky 
grappled with this same concept. My sense of purpose 
has yet to falter even in the face of the irrefutable truth 
that human behavior is subject to the same natural law 
an individual to behavioral and psychiatric problems, 
Perowne is able to ignore Baxter’s attack on his family 
and operate on him. But McEwan leaves the question 
open: isn’t Perowne’s decision to operate on Baxter still 
precisely that: a willful choice to act ethically? 
 That depends on how, exactly, we define “free will”. 
According to Siegfried (2008), “The issue is understand-
ing the complex circulation of molecular information 
that is massaged and manipulated at various stations 
by neural systems tuned to multiple decision-making 
considerations. That process is free will, even if it isn’t 
really free” (para. 9). In the end, the neurochemistry of 
the brain controls decision-making. Free will is merely 
the end, not the means to an end. In other words, if a 
person defines free will as being able to make decisions, 
then the fact that neurological firings in the brain lead 
a person to making the decision is irrelevant. 
 Accepting that free will is subject to natural law 
is a central theme in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground (1994). Dostoevsky describes the ranting 
of a man who is confronted with this very conundrum—
“Once it’s proved to you that you descended from an 
ape, there’s no use making a wry face, just take it for 
what it is” (p. 13). “It” pertains to the fact that human 
beings are subject to the same natural law as apes.  In 
the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Wasiolek (1967) 
discusses the fear of the underground man: “If the laws 
of nature really exist, then ‘free will’ is an illusion that 
will be dispelled by reason” (p. 411). The reason behind 
any choice, even the choice to deny this irrefutable 
truth, is biological.  This circular logic drives the under-
ground man mad as he cannot stop asking questions 
and over-thinking his situation. 
 I cannot help but wonder why the assumption 
that human beings are subject to natural law offends 
so many people. I cannot refute that the choices I make 
are determined by natural law or that that my experi-
ence of empathy, love, and grief is traceable to chemi-
cals. But Natural law’s innate tendency for variation 
Heather’s essay is a compelling mixture of reflective 
and analytical writing. Using her citations as signposts 
to mark the specific places where her thinking was 
challenged, her larger objective is to offer a more 
personal review of how she came to understand the 
paradoxes of natural law and the human will. We liked 
the way that this form helps to show her not merely 
receiving knowledge, but engaging it in deep dialogue 
with an existing religious viewpoint that she didn’t allow 
to be static or inflexible. The possible reconciliations that 
she offers, in the idea that variation is a key component 
of evolution and in the sense of awe regarding the 
“magnificence” of evolutionary processes, are important 
discoveries that the class had begun to make, thanks in 
large part to Heather’s contributions.
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McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005), neurosurgeon Henry 
Perowne seems to subscribe to this belief: 
“…the brain’s fundamental secret will be laid 
open one day…Could it ever be explained, how 
matter becomes conscious? . . .the secret will be 
revealed…the explanations will refine themselves 
into an irrefutable truth about consciousness” (p. 
262-263). 
Though there is not yet concrete evidence of how our 
biological matter becomes conscious, there are many 
examples that seem to illustrate that human conscious-
ness is indeed a trait that emerges according biological 
laws.     
 Being a biological function subject to natural law, 
human consciousness can be impaired, altered, or even 
temporarily suspended in accordance with biological 
properties and interactions.  For example, during sexual 
intercourse, levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine are 
greatly increased in the brain.  Dopamine, the body’s 
reward system, results in a feeling of ecstasy that results 
in a temporary lapse of consciousness (Robinson, 2006). 
This idea is mirrored in Saturday when the narrator 
describes Henry’s experience of sexual intercourse with 
that govern all plant and animal life as I do believe I 
can make choices and change the world around me.
James Ballanco
My paper focuses primarily on the phenomenon known 
as consciousness.  I wanted to prove that consciousness is 
merely a complex biological function—thus disproving that 
it is a manifestation of some God-given human superiority. 
To do this, I looked for examples in literature, supported by 
modern science, in which the human mind showed that it 
was subject to the laws of nature.  I struggled as I wrote this 
because the conclusion I came to was both provocative and 
unsettling.  It seemed wrong to suggest that human beings 
are only as free as certain biological processes allow.  In the 
end, I looked to the writing of Tennyson to support the idea 
that an absence of free will can actually be thought of as a 
soothing gift that might even be embraced.
 Human consciousness can be thought of as an 
emergent property that has evolved over many gen-
erations.  This complex trait emerges through the 
interactions of nerve cells or neurons, and supporting 
cells known as glia.  In “Animal Intelligence and the 
Evolution of the Human Mind,” Dicke and Roth 
(2008) review evidence that the unique cognitive abili-
ties of the human brain over the animal brain are not 
due to any large scale alteration of brain architecture 
but rather, due to microscopic upgrades in these fun-
damental units. More neurons and thicker myelin 
sheaths both which allow the human brain to process 
more information faster has probably played a key role 
in allowing our brains to reach a level of complexity 
that is not biologically possible in other animals (paras. 
13-17). 
 Is the human mind a set of simple neural inter-
actions that, when examined as a whole, results in 
the emergent property which we understand as con-
sciousness?  Has consciousness emerged as a result of 
evolution in the same way as other seemingly complex 
traits such as the heart or human fingerprints? In Ian 
James’s approach seemed to us highly original: 
McEwan’s novel certainly cries out to be analyzed 
in terms of actual neurochemical research, but 
given our specialized fields, chances are that no 
scholar has yet done so. James not only moves 
smoothly between paraphrase of current scientific 
studies and interpretive close reading of literature, 
but extends his observations across several 
different literary works, showing a continuity of 
concerns running through Tennyson, McEwan, 
and the science of the brain. His essay also 
captures one of our own favorite discoveries in the 
class, which is the unexpectedly efficient way that 
biology and literature can be combined to help us 
explore the question of what the mind “is,” and 
from what it derives.
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Lord Tennyson (2004) understands that it is futile for 
him to blame nature for the death of his friend and 
that death is a part of natural law over which he has 
no influence.  He writes, “I curse not nature, no, nor 
death / for nothing is that errs from law” (p. 7-8). He 
accepts that all aspects of the world are subject to this 
same natural law by stating that nothing can exist if it 
deviates from that law. For in the end, everything dies. 
And at that time, the exalted human consciousness 
ultimately is reduced to nothing more than “a weight of 
nerves without a mind” (Tennyson, 2004, p. 7).  
Greg Burke
The male bower bird is renowned for its ornate and com-
pletely individualistic nests which it builds to attract a 
mate.  During class, one student made an unsubstantiated 
remark that this behavior can be explained by the bird’s 
genes and therefore there is no choice or creativity involved 
in this very unique action. Upon hearing this I realized 
that we, as humans, assume that we alone have choice and 
creativity.  If we can defer any examples of such traits in 
the rest of the animal kingdom by ascribing them  to mere 
genetics that are “out of their control,” we can remain at the 
top of our own self constructed pyramid or Scala Naturae. 
This was the first bias that presented itself to me and caused 
me to begin asking more questions.  
 One fundamental and universally accepted saying 
is, “you can’t find what you are not looking for.” I came 
to realize that this remains particularly true in science. 
The most significant barrier in our ability to identify 
animal traits lies within the perceptive boundaries of 
being human. If an animal has an ability or a trait that 
we do not, then we cannot fairly perceive or associate 
with that trait. It will go either unnoticed or insuffi-
ciently understood. An illustration of this bias is seen in 
studies that have shown that female and male scientists 
can interpret particular interactions between opposite 
genders in a species in very different ways and “that 
where males [scientists] see dominance, females see 
equality” (Bekoff, 2002, p. 77). If we cannot even avoid 
his wife: “Now he is freed from thought, from memory, 
from the passing seconds and from the state of the 
world.  Sex is a different medium, refracting time and 
sense, a biological hyperspace as remote from conscious 
existence as dreams, or as water is from air” (McEwan, 
2005, p. 52).  Here, Henry’s temporary loss of con-
sciousness serves as a cathartic exercise.  However, it 
also shows how drastically human consciousness can be 
influenced by changing levels of dopamine [. . . .]
 Though human consciousness can be altered by 
natural processes, better evidence for its evolutionary 
emergence may lie in the ways that humans have learned 
to control it.  For example, the use of anesthesia during 
surgery demonstrates the way biological elements can 
be used to turn consciousness on and off.  To study how 
consciousness can be altered by means of anesthesia, 
researchers from the University of California-Irvine 
performed experiments (1999) using positron emis-
sion tomography (PET).  Their findings suggested that 
halothane, an inhalant anesthesia, decreased activity 
between the thalamus and the mid-brain (as cited in 
“Anesthesia,” 2009).  Thus “wake-up” signals cannot be 
processed, resulting in unconsciousness (paras. 5-6). 
This ability to manipulate consciousness is portrayed 
in Saturday, when Perowne is thinking about the sur-
gery his wife Rosalind needed to correct her vision. 
He remembers how the anesthesiologist injected the 
needle and “then she was gone” (McEwan, 2005, p. 
44), illustrating how astonishingly easy it is to control 
human consciousness. Perowne finds an odd comfort in 
the principle that this memory reconfirms, namely that 
consciousness, and the yearning self that we associate 
with it, are functions of brain chemistry.  [ . . .]
 There is no question that humans possess many 
notable differences from animals but those differences 
may only be in degree rather than in kind.  It is undeni-
able that humans, just as animals, are bound by biologi-
cal limitations that challenge any simple understanding 
of individuality.  In his long poem In Memoriam, Alfred 
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ized, much like Dostoevsky’s underground man, “that 
to be overly conscious is a sickness, a real, thorough 
sickness” (Dostoevsky, 1994, p. 6). All that I have 
learned this semester suggests that humans may not be 
so distinct from animals. We seem to place ourselves at 
the top of Scala naturae because we value most highly 
those traits which we believe unique to us.  However, 
it seems that we are part of the same spectrum as other 
animals and that this supposedly natural hierarchy has 
been turned on its side.  Am I then subject to the same 
fate as my animal brothers?  Or, as Tennyson asks, “Are 
God and Nature then at strife, / That Nature lends 
such evil dreams? / So careful of the type she seems, / 
So careless of the single life” (Tennyson, 2004, p. 40). 
Does this mean life is meaningless?  This possibility has 
kept me up at night and I wonder if I have to just “go 
ahead and accept it, there’s nothing to be done, because 
two times two is mathematics. Try objecting to that!” 
(Dostoyevsky, 1994, p. 13). Indeed, how can I possibly 
argue with what seems to be the truth?  The implica-
tions of this seem outrageously bleak to me, but I do 
not see the point in arguing if it is, in fact, the truth. 
And so I am left alone in a fog trying to find my way to 
a light I am not sure exists. 
projecting our human gender identities onto animals, 
then how can we ever be sure that we are truly perceiv-
ing what is present in the organisms we study?
 Once an observation is made, regardless of how 
unbiased it might be, it then is subject to anthropo-
morphism, a humanization of non-human behaviors, 
actions, or traits. To understand how anthropomor-
phism limits what we can understand about animals, 
just think about Hallucigenia, a Middle Cambrian aged 
fossil form the Burgess Shale formation in British 
Columbia, Canada. This creature’s name comes from 
the fact that it is one of the strangest looking species 
ever found in nature. Scientists had great difficulty try-
ing to make sense of the animal: “how can you describe 
an animal when you don’t even know which side is up, 
which end front and which back?” (Gould, 1990, p. 
154). This frustration illustrates the idea that with no 
perspective or point of reference other than our own, 
identification and interpretation of animal traits may 
be inadequate.  
 Sometimes we assign human reactions and emo-
tions to animals in an effort to associate with our non-
human companions on a human level.  For example, in 
McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005), neurosurgeon Henry 
Perowne will “never drop a live lobster into boiling 
water” (p. 128) since its set of polymodal nocipetor sites 
are similar to ours, and he extrapolates from this that 
the lobster must perceive pain in the same ways that we 
do. By humanizing an animal, we create a closeness to 
another species and sometimes a sense of solidarity, but 
this practice arguably just reflects our own conscious-
ness rather than the experiences of the life forms we 
perceive. 
 As I became more aware of how this bias operates, 
I also became hopelessly conscious of inherent human 
biases in general, and how impossible it is to under-
stand anything, even our own selves, objectively. I found 
myself continually questioning all things that I once 
took as truth and it began to frighten me. I soon real-
Greg’s discovery that scientific methods are subject 
to inevitable bias is essentially epistemological (i.e., 
a discovery of how we form knowledge). It is also an 
example of interdisciplinary “emergence” because his 
initial curiosity about this problem, which would not 
typically be cultivated in an empirically-based course 
of study, was instead ignited by fiction and poetry that 
insistently asked whether or not humans can know 
themselves objectively. In turn, however, it was only by 
studying the actual “hard” science that Greg saw this 
literary theme take on meaning and become real. His 
ideas reveal a dynamic interchange between the two 
subjects that also corresponds to the formal features of 
his writing, as he moves between adroit deployment of 
scientific vocabulary and an almost confessional level of 
personal/reflective writing.
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pendently evolved in species such as bats, birds, and 
insects.  The fact that intelligence itself has not been 
reproduced—despite the fact that “Human intelligence 
may be best likened to an upgrade of the cognitive 
capacities of nonhuman primates rather than an excep-
tionally advanced form of cognition” (Dicke & Roth, 
2008, para. 1)—suggests that it may not be as much of a 
beneficial characteristic as it is generally believed to be. 
In other words, it is possible that intelligence as seen in 
the human species is not a benefit to long-term growth. 
 In our current socially constructed realities, it 
seems as though intelligence needs to be checked by 
some type of greater force in order to maintain a state of 
nonviolent and peaceful equilibrium. Kathleen Gibson 
(2002), for example, points out that “higher orders of 
intentionality are mental constructs that create relation-
ships among ideas and embed ideas within each other 
to form higher order constructs” (p. 16). This hierarchy 
of intentionality can ultimately lead to deception. 
According to Daniel Dennett’s rubric of intentionality 
(1998), for example, “’x believes that p’ represents first 
order intentionality; ‘x wants y to believe that x is hun-
gry’ represents second order intentionality; and ‘x wants 
y to believe that x believes he is all alone’ represents 
third order intentionality” (as cited in Gibson, 2002, p. 
Shawne Lomauro
Academia is much like a two edged sword. Learning is a 
passion, but along with it comes a responsibility of knowl-
edge, so strong, that it can make you question why we seek 
to expand our horizons of thought. This feeling of angst has 
become a typical part of my academic life, so researching 
and delving into it only seemed like a normal reaction. The 
nexus of literature and biology gave me just the platform 
to begin this exploration. The use of human language gives 
the optimal viewpoint into the lengths that human thought 
and creativity can go. Meanwhile, evolutionary biology 
allowed me a space in which to question the necessity and, 
ultimately, the diminishing returns of that ability. While 
studying what I began to call the destructive capacity of 
human thought, the vast array of emotions I felt along 
my path to knowledge only seemed more normal. Deeper 
knowledge, it seems, is truly a Promethean gift. 
 The underground man’s misery, set beside his 
assertion that he is more intelligent than all other men, 
shows that higher levels of intelligence as seen in the 
human species may indeed be detrimental to our devel-
opment and success. The underground man claims, “I’m 
guilty of being more intelligent than all those around 
me” (Dostoyevsky, 1994, p. 88). Although he recognizes 
within himself the ability for higher intelligence, that 
intelligence reaches a point of diminishing returns. 
He cannot better himself with this knowledge, and it 
instead leads to his isolation and demise. This predica-
ment also suggests that other animals have the biologi-
cal capacity for higher levels of cognition, but such an 
adaptation has not yet occurred. This has potentially 
startling ramifications, given that, at least according 
to evolutionary theory, beneficial characteristics tend 
to repeat themselves independently within nature. For 
example, the highly advantageous camera eyes found 
in humans and in octopi is believed to have evolved 
independently in these two lineages, suggesting that 
advantageous traits evolve multiple times in nature. 
The wing, and subsequent benefit of flight, have inde-
Shawne’s essay is probably the best example of 
interdisciplinary thought as an emergent property. It 
combines associative, interpretive and critical thought 
in compelling ways. As she interprets the theme of 
burdensome knowledge in Dostoevsky via close 
reading, she also associates it with scientific studies 
of deception or confusion in the communication of 
intention. She then contextualizes these ideas not 
in philosophical reasoning about the paradoxes of 
knowing, but in terms of observations that Biologists 
are just beginning to make about the ways that human 
intelligence may not be a fully adaptive, environmentally 
successful trait.  Finally, she applies this entire matrix of 
ideas to a third discipline, that of social justice, a topic 
that is deeply relevant to her academic and personal life.
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biological than we might suppose. Like biological 
emergence, it arguably happens not because two distinct 
elements or in this case, two self-contained “disciplines” 
are interacting, but because the disciplinary limits cease 
to contain or control the live elements or components 
within them. The concepts, skills, and objectives that 
we tend to think of as comprising a discipline begin 
to interact independent of their original systems, 
evolving into a new, interactive system of inquiry 
and expression.   Upon reflection, perhaps it was our 
decision to not force traditional learning outcomes in 
either Biology or English literature upon our students. 
We eventually came to accept that in a course such as 
Minds and Bodies, the learning cannot and should not 
be constrained through rigid predetermined objectives 
but rather allowed to emerge naturally; the real chal-
lenge is finding a way to encourage that emergence and 
as professors, accepting the unpredictability. Cardinal 
Newman (1959), who also used a biological metaphor 
to describe the integration of core learning in the Jesuit 
tradition, was perhaps thinking of something similar 
when he proposed that “all branches of knowledge [in 
a core curriculum] are . . . not isolated and independent 
of one another, but form together a whole system; . . 
. they run into each other, and complete each other” 
(p. 221).  The important difference, as we experienced 
it, is that this “whole system” is neither closed nor 
predetermined.  ––
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